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THIRD DEPARTMENT
29 2 7
People v. Reilly

(decided January 20, 1994)
The defendant claimed that his right to be free from illegal
searches and seizures was violated under both the State2928 and
Federal 2929 Constitutions when two deputies conducted a
warrantless search of his property. 2930 The defendant claimed
that the area that the deputies entered was constitutionally
protected under the doctrine of "curtilage."2931 The court held
that, although the area was not within the curtilage, it was
constitutionally protected because of the defendant's affirmative
acts to maintain privacy. 2932 Thus, the court concluded that the
deputies illegally entered the defendant's property. 2 933
2927. 195 A.D.2d 95, 606 N.Y.S.2d 836 (3d Dep't 1994).
2928. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision provides in relevant part
that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... " Id.
2929. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This section states in relevant part that: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Id.
2930. Reilly, 195 A.D.2d at 98, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837. Defendant's property
consisted of a 10 acre parcel which included a cottage located 425 feet from
defendant's residence within an area of mown grass and landscaped
surroundings. Id. at 97-99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837-39. No fence surrounded the
residence and there was an unmowed area of brush and small trees about 160
to 180 feet from the residence, which separated the residence, its yard and the
outbuildings from the cottage. Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
2931. 195 A.D.2d at 98, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838 ("Curtilage is generally
defined as an area that is related to the 'intimate activities of the home.'"
quoting People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 558, 523 N.E.2d 291, 297, 528
N.Y.S.2d 15, 21 (1988) (citations omitted)); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 348 (6th ed. 1990). In addition, curtilage is defined as "the land
or grounds surrounding the dwelling, which are necessary and convenient and
habitually used for family purposes and carrying on domestic employment."
Id.
2932. Reilly, 195 A.D.2d at 99-100, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838-40.
2933. Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
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The controversy at issue arose when two deputies walked onto
the defendant's property. 2934 They gained access by walking
through a field, along a fence, through a heavily wooded area,
and then going through a break in the fence. 2935 Having gained
access to the defendant's property, the deputies stood near a
cottage located by the defendant's residence. 2936 While there,

they smelled marijuana from the vent of the air conditioner
located in the cottage. 2937 They then walked through a "small
wooded" area located near the defendant's residence and found
marijuana plants growing. 2938 Finally, they left the premises and
obtained a search warrant for the cottage. 2939 The warrant was
executed and marihuana plants were seized from the defendant's
property. 2 940 The defendant was subsequently arrested on a
charge of "criminal possession of marijuana in the first degree
and unlicensed growing of marijuana."2941
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the deputies had illegally
.entered the "curtilage" of his residence. 2942 The court held that
2934. Id. at 97, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
2935. Id.
2936. Id. The deputies entered the property by:
[W]alking over an adjacent field, following the fence along defendant's
east line more than 1,400 feet and into a heavily wooded area north of
defendant's property, and then traversing a break in the fence line at the
rear of defendant's property. They then walked out of the woods and
across defendant's property several hundred feet to a cottage behind
defendant's residence ....
Id.
2937. Id.
2938. Id. at 97, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 837-38.
2939.1d. at 97, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
2940. Id.
2941. Id.
2942. Id. at 98, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The cottage was 425 feet away, and
the brush-area and small trees were 160 to 180 feet from the residence. Id. at
99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. Second, there was no fence surrounding the
residence and an unmowed portion of brush and trees separated the residence
from the cottage. Id. Although the court noted that the cottage itself was within
an area of mown grass and surrounded by a pond, gazebo and lawn furniture,
this was still insufficient to satisfy the second factor as analyzed. Id. Third,
even though there was no "objective data" possessed by the deputies to indicate
that the cottage "was not being used for intimate activities of the home," the
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the deputies had not, in fact, entered the curtilage of the
defendant. 2943 The court reasoned that the proximity of the area
claimed to be within the curtilage of the defendant's residence
was too far out to be within the curtilage. 2 944 The court
concluded that defendant's cottage, the immediate area
surrounding it, and the unmowed area where the patches of
marijuana were seen, did not fall within the definition of
5
curtilage. 294
The court, however, held that the defendant's suppression
motion should have been granted. 2 946 The court reasoned that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area on
which the deputies walked.
[T]he property was bounded on the south by a road, on the north
by heavy woods and a low wire fence and on the east and west
by a pretension steel fence that appeared electrified. [Tihe
cottage was surrounded by a well-mown lawn, lines of shrubs, a
pond containing a dock and diving board, as well as a gazebo
2 9 47
and patio.

All of that, despite the absence of "No Trespassing" signs,
suggested the owner's expectation of privacy. 2948 The court held
cottage was vacant and a strong odor of marijuana emanated from it. Id.
Although the defendant had testified at the suppression hearing that the area
was used for "backyard" activities, the cottage contained marijuana plants,
hoses for irrigation and a timer to control the lights and temperature. Id. at 99,
606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. These facts indicated to the deputies that the cottage was
not "'associated with the activities and privacies of domestic life'" as they
would have been had the cottage been part of defendant's residence. Id.
(quoting United States v. Dunn, 180 U.S. 291, 303 (1987)). In addition, in
Dunn, the Court stated that the third factor - use put to the area - was an
"especially significant" factor. Id. at 98, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (quoting Dunn,
480 U.S. at 302). Fourth, even though the area may not be readily visible to

the public, the defendant did not have fences to prevent persons from
observing the area and cottage which were 750 feet from the road. Id. at 98,
606 N.Y.S.2d at 839
2943. Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
2944. Id.
2945. Id.
2946. Id. at 101, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
2947. Id.
2948. Id.
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that where a person's property is substantially enclosed on all
sides and well cared for, the landowner has indicated an
expectation of privacy therein. 2 949 Since the application for the
search warrant was based upon observations made by deputies
during their illegal entry, the warrant was not legally sufficient
and all of the evidence obtained through the execution of the
warrant was suppressed. 2950
The court based its holding upon the proposition stated in
People v. Scott.2 95 1 The court in Scott held that persons who

"post 'No Trespassing' signs on their private property or, by

some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not
permitted, . . . their privacy rights will be respected
and ... they will be free from unwanted intrusions .... "2952
2949. Id.
2950. Id.
2951. Id.; see also People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). The court in Reilly determined that People v. Scott
could be applied retroactively. Reilly, 195 A.D.2d at 100, 606 N.Y.S.2d at
840. The court applied a "three-factor test" to determine the retroactivity of
Scott. Id. at 100, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The three-factor test required
consideration of "(1) the purpose served by the new rule, (2) the extent of
reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of
the retroactive application of the new rule." Id. at 100, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 83940 (citations omitted). Using this test, the court determined that Scott would
apply retroactively in this case. Id. at 101, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 840. In this
regard, the court refused to follow Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984), which reaffirmed the "open fields" doctrine that states there is no
personal or societal privacy expectation in open fields and thus allowing
warrantless observations. Id. at 99, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
2952. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
The defendant lived in a mobile home near a two-lane highway. Id. at 479,
593 N.E.2d at 1331, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 923. In 1987, a person was deer hunting
and followed the deer onto the defendant's property. Id. at 479, 593 N.E.2d at
1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. When on the property, he saw what seemed to be
the remains of marihuana plants. Id. In July 1988, the hunter went onto
defendant's property again and he saw about 50 marihuana plants growing. Id.
He reported this to the police and the police asked him to get a leaf from one
of the plants, and he did. Id. A police officer went back with the hunter to the
defendant's property to observe the plants; these visits were not authorized by
the defendant. Id. Thereafter, the police used the hunter's statement as the
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the defendant's property. Id. The

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/92

4

et al.: Search and Seizure

1292

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

The federal standard for determining whether land is within
"curtilage" was most recently summarized in United States v.
Dunn.2 9 5 3 The Court in Dunn explained that the curtilage is the

place that is "so intimately tied to the home itself that it should
be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment
protection. ' 2954 The Court articulated four factors which it felt
should be considered when determining if an area is within the
constitutionally protected curtilage area. 2955 Those four factors
are:
[The proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
defendant had 'No Trespassing' signs conspicuously posted around his
property. Id. at 479, 593 N.E.2d at 1330-31, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23.
2953. 480 U.S. 294 (1987). In 1980, the defendant was found by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) to have purchased equipment that was
used to produce amphetamine and phenylacetone. Id. at 296. The DEA agents
obtained a warrant which permitted them to install beepers at the defendant's
home in various locations. Id. The beeper transmissions indicated that one of
the containers of chemicals was being taken to a ranch which was owned by
the defendant. Id. at 297. Two days later, officers entered the property without
a warrant. Id.
Respondent's ranch comprised approximately 198 acres and was
completely encircled by a perimeter fence. The property also contained
several interior fences, constructed mainly of posts and multiple strands
of barbed wire. The ranch residence was situated a half a mile from a
public road. A fence encircled the residence and a nearby small
greenhouse. Two barns were located approximately fifty yards from this
fence. The front of the larger of the two barns was enclosed by a
wooden fence and had an open overhang. Locked, waist-high gates
barred entry into the barn proper, and netting material stretched from
the ceiling to the top of the wooden gates.
Id. A DEA agent entered the defendant's property by "cross[ing] over the
perimeter fence and one interior fence." Id. At that point the agents smelled
phenylacetic acid from the barn. Id. They went toward the barn and to do that
crossed over a barbed wire fence. Id. The officers saw nothing incriminating
in the barn. Id. They then proceeded to a larger barn owned by the defendant
by crossing over another barbed wire fence and a wooden fence. Id. at 297-98.
The officers shined a light into the barn and saw a phenylacetone laboratory.
Id. at 298. The officers then obtained a warrant to enter the ranch after visiting
the barn two more times. Id. The defendant was then arrested. Id. at 298-99.
2954. Id. at 301.
2955. Id.
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home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the
steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
2956
by people passing by.

Using these considerations, the Court determined that the
defendant's barn and the area immediately surrounding it were
not within the curtilage and it was proper to enter upon it.2957
Because the New York Court of Appeals refused to follow the
'open fields' doctrine enumerated in Oliver v. United States,2958

defendants' curtilage under state law is given greater protection.
Stender v. City of Albany 2 9 5 9
(decided December 31, 1992)

Plaintiffs brought this action for a declaratory judgment to
determine the constitutionality of the city of Albany's housing
2 9 60
code, the Residential Housing Occupancy Permit Provisions.

The plaintiff asserted that these provisions violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution 2 9 6 1 and article I,
2956. Id.
2957. Id.
2958. 466 U.S. at 178-79 (holding that there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy in "open fields").
2959. 188 A.D.2d 986, 592 N.Y.S.2d 70 (3d Dep't 1992).
2960. Id. at 986, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 71; ALBANY HousING CODE, art. 111,
§14-129. This code provision provides in pertinent part:
The Building Department shall have the right to inspect all or any part
of the rental dwelling, including any unit or apartment or entire multiple
residence, except that the owner, agent or person in charge thereof shall
have the right to insist upon the procurement of a search warrant from a
court of competent jurisdiction by the Commissioner of Buildings in
order to enable such inspection. The officials charged with conducting
the housing inspection pursuant to this ordinance shall be required to
obtain a search warrant whenever an owner, agent or person in charge
refuses to permit a warrantless inspection of the premises after having
been advised that he or she has a constitutional right to refuse entry of
the officials without a search warrant.
Id at 14-131(b).
2961. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The provision states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
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